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HERRING v. UNITED STATEs:

MAPP's

''ARTLEss'' OvERRULING?
Michael Vitiello*
l.

I NTRO D UCTION

Well before the 2008 term ends, I can safely predict that Herring v. United
States 1 will be one of the most important cases decided during this term .
While arguably a narrow decision, few readers can miss its sweeping logic,
effectively eroding the gene ral application of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule? Commentators have already speculated about the impe nding
demise of Mapp v. Ohio , 3 the landmark decis ion requiring states to apply the
exclus ionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.4
Given a long line of decisions eroding Mapp, 5 should the current Court' s
critics really be surprised at Mapp 's impending demise? I think that the answer
is an unequivocal "yes," and that the Herring majority 's approach is more evidence of how di sdainful some members of the Court are about following precedent and observing recogni zed conventions established by the Court. 6
O ver forty-five years ago, Professor Jerold Israel published an impressive
article about the "art of overruling" precedent. 7 In it, he argued that traditionall y the Court has followed certain constraints before it has overruled precedent. Following those constraints de monstrates the Court's commitment to the
rule of law, that it is acting " as a disinterested decision-maker applying those
fundamental values reflected in the Constitution."s Professor Israe l identified a
number of rhetorical arguments that the Court relied on when overruling prece-

*

Distingui shed Professor and Scho lar, Uni vers ity o f the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;
B.A. Swarthmore College, 1969, J.D., Uni vers ity of Pennsylvania, 1974. My thanks to my
research assistant Cameron Des mond for her he lp w ith this essay.
1 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
2 As cited in a recent article in the New York Times, one district court judge has already
read Herring broadly. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Edging Closer to Repeal of Evidence
Ruling, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 3 1, 2009, at A 1. The Fourth Amendment is si lent on the appropriate remedy for violations of that amendment. Although civil damages may be available to a
person aggrieved by an illegal search, the most common remedy is the exclusion of evidence
at trial ; hence the term, the "exc lusionary rule." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974).
3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 196 1).
4
Liptak, supra note 2.
5 See inji·a text accompanying no tes 86- 1 16.
6 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 50 I U.S. 808, 834 ( 1991 ) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7 Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art " of Overruling, 1963 SuP. Cr. REv.
2 11 ( 1963).
8 /d. at 2 17.
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dent: 9 an argument that focused on changed conditions, making its earlier precedent inapplicable to the current legal climate; a second argument that focused
on lessons of experience, indicating the earlier case failed to meet the test of
time; and a third kind of argument that focused on the erosion of the earlier
decision, so weakening the earlier decision as to make it unsupportable. 10
Thus, overruling was justified to bring the case law in line with the intervening
case law. 11 In addition, Professor Israel identified a number of other arguments, including reliance on the fact that earlier precedent may have been
decided by a narrow majority of the Court, to justify overruling precedent by
suggesting that a case decided by a single vote could not claim wide
acceptance. 12
The central thesis of this essay is that, consistent with the "art of overruling," the Court could have limited Mapp, for example, by extending the goodfaith reasonable mistake rationale that animates cases like United States v.
Leon. 13 As developed below, the facts of Herring are quite similar to the facts
of other cases where the Court upheld police conduct that, although erroneous,
seemed reasonable; accordingly, excluding the illegally obtained evidence had
no value as a deterrent of future conduct in light of the reasonableness of the
police officer's mistake. 14 However, Herring goes much further and points
towards a much greater tolerance towards police misconduct because it allows
the use of illegally seized evidence, unless it was the product of at least reckless
conduct on the part of the police. If the Court, in fact, follows Herring's logic
and extends that rule to all searches, the Court will have adopted a rule without
precedential support. Instead, the Court will be imposing the rule with no
authority other than its own ipse dixit.
The first part of this essay reviews Herring. Thereafter, it explores in
more depth Professor Israel's analysis and applies it first to Mapp to demonstrate how the Court has, in fact, honored this convention, and then demonstrates how this Court could, were it inclined towards restraint, justify cutting
back on Mapp. 15 Finally, this essay demonstrates how radical Herring's analysis really is.

9

Professor Israel's specific thesis was that Justice Black failed to follow those constraints,
even though he could have, in Gideon. !d. at 272. Many justices continue to use si milar
arguments when they argue in favor of overruling precedent. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129
S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (limiting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
10
Israel, supra note 7, at 224-25.
II fd. at 224.
12
/d. at 226.
13
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 16-25, 113-116.
15
I do not support cutting back on Mapp's protection. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello & Jane C.
Burger, Mapp's Exclusionary Rule: Is the Court Crying Wolf? , 86 DICK. L. REv. 15, 37
(1981). Instead, my thesis is that several members of the right wing of the Court lack the
kind of deference to precedent that would allow them to modify Mapp; instead, they seem
ready to make an unwarranted break from the past.

l66
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UNITED STATES

On July 7, 2004, the petitioner Bennie Dean Herring drove to the Coffee
County, Alabama sheriffs department to retrieve something from his vehicle in
the police impoundment lot. 16 An investigator asked the county's warrant clerk
to see if the sheriff's department had any outstanding warrants for Herring. 17
When she found none, the investigator had her check with Dale County. 18 The
Dale County clerk reported that it had an active warrant for Herring's arrest. 19
Relying on that information, the investigator and a sheriffs deputy arrested
Herring. 20 The search incident to the arrest uncovered methamphetamine and a
pistol. 21 When the Dale County clerk attempted to follow up on her promise to
fax the warrant, she was unable to find the warrant. 22 She learned that the
warrant had been recalled five months earlier, a fact that should have been
noted in the computer system. 23 The Dale County clerk immediately called her
counterpart in Coffee County to relay the information.2 4 Herring's arrest and
search had already taken place. 25
Indicted for violations of federal gun and drug laws, Herring moved
unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence.26 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, finding that, even if the investigator violated
the Fourth Amendment, he acted in good faith because he believed that the
warrant was still in effect. 27 In fact, the district court adopted the magistrate's
rationale that there was "'no reason to believe that application of the exclusionary rule here would deter the occurrence of any future mistakes.' " 28 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 29 In doing so, it observed that, while whoever failed to
update the Dale County's records was a law enforcement official, the conduct
was merely negligent, and not "'a deliberate or tactical choice to act.' " 30 Subsequently, the Court granted review in light of a split among lower courts on
the issue. 31
While raising questions about the legality of the underlying conduct, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a narrow majority of the Court, began his analysis
with the assumption that the original conduct violated the Fourth Amendment
and instead, asked whether the reliance on the warrant brought the case within
16

30

Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 699.
/d.
!d.
/d.
/d. (quoting Herring v. United States, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (lith Cir. 2007)).

31

/d.

17
18

19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26

27

28
29
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exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 32 Chief Justice Roberts described several
principles that, despite considerable debate, a majority of the justices over the
past forty years have been able to establish as part of the Court's post-Mapp
case law. For example, because the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally
mandated, 33 the Court applies the exclusionary rule only if its application
serves its purpose as a deterrent of police conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment. 34 Further, even if the application of the rule would have a deterrent effect, the Court now requires that "the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs,"35 and those costs may be substantial (including the release of
potentially dangerous defendants).3 6
Chief Justice Roberts then reviewed the case law establishing a good-faith
reasonableness exception to the application of the exclusionary rule,37 starting
with Leon and ending with other post-Mapp cases like Illinois v. Krull, 38 and
Arizona v. Evans ?9 Although criticized as beyond the initial rationale of
Leon, 4 Krull extended Leon's holding to police reliance on a statute later
found unconstitutiona1. 41 Evans extended the good-faith reasonableness exception to cover police reliance on erroneous information in a court's database that
a warrant was outstanding for Evans' arrest. 42
While Evans is quite similar on its facts to Herring , Evans left open the
question faced in Herring. In Evans, the court, not law enforcement, maintained the files. 43 Accordingly, the Court left open the question "whether the
evidence should be suppressed if police personnel were responsible for the
error."44
Existing precedent, including Leon, Krull, Evans, and other post-Mapp
cases that cabined the exclusionary rule, 45 crafted an exception that required
good faith on the officer' s part and, more importantly, insisted that the officer's
reliance on other actors in the system must be reasonable. 46 In reliance47 on

°

32 /d. Chief Justice Roberts stated the precise question before the Court: "What if an
officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding ruTest warrant, but that belief turns out to
be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee?" /d. at
698.
33 /d. at 699-700.
34 /d.
35 ld. at 700-01.

/d.
Id. at 70 I.
38 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 ( 1987).
39 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. I ( 1995).
40
The central premise of Leon was that magistrates were not involved in ferreting out crime
and did not need to be deterred by the possible application of the exclusionary rule. Subsequent cases have extended the good-faith reasonableness exception to other actors, not just
judicial officers. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-17 (1984). For criticism of cases
like Krull , see Justice O'Connor's dissent, arguing, in part, that Leon turned "explicitly on
the tradition of judicial independence," unlike the legislature that acted explicitly to assist
law enforcement. Krull, 480 U.S. at 365.
41
Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50.
42
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 70 I.
43 Evans, 514 U.S. at 5.
44
!d. at 16 n.5.
45
See discussion infra notes 48-49.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
36
37
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language from Leon 4 8 and Krul/, 49 Herring lays out a much more permissive
rule regarding violations of the Fourth Amendment. Building on the thesis of
Judge Friendly's law review article on the exclusionary rule, 50 the Court contended that the exclusionary rule should be limited to "flagrant or deliberate"
violations of Fourth Amendment rights. 51 Ignoring many Supreme Court cases
in which the Court suppressed evidence based on conduct that was arguably
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances,52 the Court suggested that
the exclusionary rule case law, like Weeks v. United States 53 and Mapp, turned
on the flagrant conduct of the police. 54 According to Chief Justice Roberts,
"An error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far
removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in the first
place."55 Further, "[S)ince Leon," according to Chief Justice Roberts, "we
have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than this."56
Summing up its view, the Court stated, "To trigger the exclusionary rule,
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by
the justice system." 57 Thus, according to Herring, the exclusionary rule is premised on a showing of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in
some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence."58
The remaining portion of the decision returned to the application of its
analysis to the facts before the Court. It suggested how a defendant might
make a sufficient showing of reckless conduct; for example, if he can show that
47

As developed below, the reliance is misleading.
"As we said in Leon, 'an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes
an important step in the calculus' of applying the exclusionary rule." Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 911). Quite distinctly, Leon
did not excuse police for negligent conduct; instead, its core holding focused on the reasonableness of police reliance on the magistrate's issuance of the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
49 "Similarly, in Krull, we elaborated that 'evidence should be suppressed only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. "' Herring,
129 S. Ct. at 701 (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987)). Like Leon, Krull was premised on the reasonableness of the
officer's belief. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349.
50 Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv.
929, 953 (1965).
51 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
52 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980) (suppressi ng evidence
despite police reliance on a statute authorizing in-home arrest without a warrant); Chime! v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (overruling precedent that allowed police to make a full
in-home search when a lawful arrest took place in the home).
53 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, officers entered the defendant's
home by using a key shown to them by one of Weeks's neighbors, confiscated papers, and
returned later with a federal marshal. !d. at 386.
54 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 ("Equally flagrant conduct was at issue in Mapp v.
Ohio ....").
55 /d.
56 !d.
57 /d.
58 !d.
48
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police have knowi ngly made fal se entries or have been reckless in the way that
they have maintained their warrant system. 59

III.

THE

ART OF O VERRULING PRECEDENT

A lot has changed since Professor Israel wrote his article on the art of
overruling precedent. Presidential candidates have made the Court a campaign
issue. 60 Mostly Republican Presidents have had the chance to effect a makeover of the Court.61 Despite fears of counter-revolutions undoing Warren
Court precedent,62 by and large justices have continued to follow the conventions that Israel observed in his article. 63 As developed in this section, those
conventions are an important part of the rule of law.
The Court has long recognized that stare decisis has a more limited application in constitutional cases than in cases involving statutory construction, a
difference premised on the greater difficulty in amending the Constitution.64
At the same time, adherence to precedent furthers important values.
Foreswearing one's own view of the law in deference to existing case law demonstrates a justice's commitment to the rule of law.65 While the Critical Legal
Studies movement reminded us that the law is indeterrninate,66 we would have
far more cynicism about the law if justices did not feel constrained by precedent. Israel notes, "[T]he view of the Court as an impersonal adjudicator has
depended to some degree on the assumption that the judge, unlike the legislator, is sharply restricted in relying upon his personal predilections by the necessity of following the decisions of his predecessors."67
59

/d. at 703.
See Vitiello & Burger, supra note 15, at 15-16 (discussing how Nixon and Reagan made
campaign promi ses to appoint conservative judges if elected).
61
President Johnson appointed Abc Fortas in 1965 and Thurgood Marshall in 1967; President Nixon appointed Warren Earl Burger in 1969, Harry Blackmun in 1970, Lewis Powell
in 1972, and William Rehnquist in 1972; President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens in
1975; President Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981 , Antonin Scalia in 1986,
and Anthony Kennedy in 1988; President George H. W. Bush appointed David Souter in
1990 and Clarence Thomas in 199 1; President C linton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1993 and Stephen Breyer in 1994; President George W. Bush appointed Jo hn Roberts in
2005 and Samuel Ali to in 2006. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
62 See generally THE BuRGER CouRT: THE CouNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1986).
63 For example, almost certainly, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were appointed to
the Court with an eye towards their overruling Roe v. Wade. Drew C. Ensign, The Impact of
Liberty on Stare Decisis: The Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 8 1 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1137, 1145-46 (2006). When they had the chance to do so, they refused, based on principles
of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 ( 1992).
64 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
65
Or, as Professor Israel frames the point, it furthers the image of the Court as "a disinterested decision-maker applying those fundamental values reflected in the Constitution."
Israel, supra note 7, at 216-17.
66 Jerry L. Anderson, Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies , 54 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 20 1, 20 1 (2004).
67 Israel, supra note 7, at 217.
60
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Flowing from the need to maintain the image as "impersonal adjudicator"
is a need to follow the kinds of arguments identified by Professor Israel when
the Court overrules precedent. Overruling precedent invites the conclusion that
the change in the law is the result of the change in court personnel and not the
result of an objective process of doctrinal evolution.68
Israel identified several "techniques" that many justices have used when
the Court has overruled precedent. Most justices recognize that the "' law may
grow to meet changing conditions'" and that they reject" 'slavish adherence to
authority where new conditions require new rules of conduct.' " 69 As a result,
justices have relied on "changed conditions" to justify departure from
precedent.70
A second technique focuses on the lessons of experience. Israel cited a
number of instances in which the Court relied on this rationale in overturning
precedent. 71 At times, the Court has concluded that its earlier doctrine has not
achieved the original goal, requiring a rethinking of its position in light of the
unintended consequences of its case law. 72
Israel found a third technique in a majority of decisions overruling precedent: the Court has supported its decision by demonstrating the erosion of the
precedent to be overruled. Relying on intervening case law allows the Court to
demonstrate the inconsistency between the decision being reexamined and subsequent developments; thus, the Court is left with " no choice but to overrule the
earlier decision, since that ruling is totally irreconcilable with subsequent
cases.'m Consequently, the Court may argue that the decision to overrule is
not the result of a group of like-minded newcomers to the bench, but the work
of justices who have decided the cases in the interim, often over a period of
years. The change in the law is, therefore, not a sudden shift, but a long process of evolution. 74 The Court may also be able to point to earlier precedent,
predating the case about to be overruled, as a way to show that the Court is
68

!d. at 218-19.
/d. at 219 (quoting Mahnich v. S.S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 ( 1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). Although Israel was writing long before the debate over originalism, not even Justice
Scalia adheres to a strict original understanding of the Constitution. For example, while
writing to uphold the historical rule of in-hand service, Justice Scalia did not argue in favor
of returning to the original understanding of due process found in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877). See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
70
Israel, supra note 7, at 220. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), may be
the most famous example demonstrating this kind of argument. In that case, the Court cited
the fact that the role of public schools had changed so signjficantly since Plessy v. Ferguson
established the principle of separate but equal. It also cited changes in psychological understanding of how children develop. /d. at 492-94.
7 1 Israel, supra note 7, at 221. Among the most famous of these cases is Mapp. See infra
text accompanying notes 76-85.
72
/d. at 222-23. For a quite recent example of this kind of argument see Arizona v. Cant,
129 S. Ct. 17 10, 1723 (2009), which notes that "[t]he experience of the 28 years since we
decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that
decision is unfounded."
73
Israel, supra note 7, at 224.
74 /d. at 225. For a very recent example of this kind of argument, see Gam, 129 S. Ct. at
1723, which notes that the dissent "ignores the checkered history of the search-incident-toarrest exception."
69
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going back to an earlier rule; in effect, the case to be overruled was the aberration, not the current Court's decision.
Finally, Israel identified some other arguments the Court has relied upon.
For example, a case decided by a closely divided Court may not be entitled to
the same deference as a decision with the full backing of the Court. 75 Presumably, the fact that the Court was closely divided, especially in light of a powerful
dissent, suggests that the decision was controversial even from the outset.
Mapp represents a good case to explore Israel's thesis. Justice Clark faced
significant challenges in preparing his majority opinion. Notably, only twelve
years earlier, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado 76 rejected the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment required the states to exclude evidence taken in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 77 Justice Clark's majority relied on the techniques that
Professor Israel identified. For example, the Court relied on several post-Wolf
decisions that had eroded the foundations of Wolf. 18 Specifically, Justice Clark
pointed to the expansion of standing, the rejection of the "silver platter" doctrine79 and the use of injunctions to prevent federal officials from giving state
officials illegally-seized evidence. 80
In addition, the Court emphasized the pre- Wolf case law. 81 In effect, Justice Clark implied that the earlier case law like Weeks had it right. That is,
Weeks and the post- Wolf cases like Elkins v. United States 82 were logically
consistent, providing necessary protection against Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, Mapp was simply bringing case law in line with that earlier precedent. Hence, Wolf, not Mapp, was the aberration.
Further, the Court was reexamining the issue in part because Wolf was
"bottomed on factual considerations" 83 now seen to be incorrect. Specifically,
Wolf relied on the fact that a "particularly impressive" number of states rejected
the application of the exclusionary rule. 84 In the interim, "more than half of
those since passing upon [whether to adopt the exclusionary rule] ... have
wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule."85 Thus, Wolf failed the
lesson of experience.
75

Israel, supra note 7, at 226; See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 11 5 (1941)
(citing the fact that the case that the Court was overruling was decided by a bare majority,
over a "now classic dissent" of Justice Holmes).
7 6 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
77 /d. at 33.
78 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,653 (196 1); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,208
( 1960) (rejecting the silver platter doctrine); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-65
( 1960) (expanding standing for Fourth Amendment violations); Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 2 14, 2 17 (1956) (allowing use of injunctions to prevent fed eral officials from handing
state officials evidence illegally seized).
79
The "silver platter" doctrine described the situation in which state officials, not subject to
the exclusionary rule, could conduct an illegal search and merely hand over the evidence to
federal authorities. See Mapp, 361 U.S. at 653.
80 See id.; Rea, 350 U.S. at 217 (allowing use of injunctions to prevent federal officials
from handing state officials evidence illegally seized).
8l Mapp, 361 U.S. at 649-50.
82 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
83 Mapp , 361 U.S. at 651.
84 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
85 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
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As Professor Israel demonstrates, Mapp is hardly unique in following
these kinds of arguments. And as argued above, their importance is significant:
these arguments are part of the rule of law. They allow the Court to evolve
doctrine without leaving the Court open to the claim that the current decision is
merely a preference of a new majority of the Court.
IV.

EXTENDING PRECEDENT

A day after the Court announced its decision in Herring, a student in my
Criminal Procedure course asked for my views on the opinion. At that point, I
had only read a media account of the Court's decision and said that it was at
most a minor extension of the Court's precedent. I was quite shortsighted in
my response. In this section, however, I argue how the Court might have
reached its conclusion that the evidence should have not been suppressed without an unwarranted departure from existing case law.
Mapp has had a rocky history, starting not long after the Court's decision.
Mapp made clear that the exclusionary rule was grounded in the Constitution. 86
Further, Justice Clark identified two purposes that the rule served: deterrence
of illegal police conduct and judicial integrity. 87 Within a few years, however,
the Court emphasized the deterrence rationale as the primary purpose of the
rule when it denied retroactive effect to its holding in Mapp; applying the rule
retroactively makes little sense if the rule is designed to deter illegal police
conduct. 88
During the 1970s and 1980s, after rapid changes in Court personnel, the
Court narrowed the exclusionary rule in a series of decisions. 89 The Court
grounded those decisions, such as Linkletter v. Walker ,90 in the view that the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule was deterrence of illegal police conduct.91 For example, in United States v. Calandra, 92 the Court both ignored
the judicial integrity rationale and refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
grand jury proceedings. Instead, the Court relied on a cost-benefit analysis,
whereby any marginal deterrence might be outweighed by the cost to society of
suppressing the evidence. 93 Two years later, Justice Blackmun cited Calandra
for the proposition that the Court "has established that the 'prime purpose' of
86

!d. at 655; see also id. at 675-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (assuming as much).
/d. at 656, 659 (majority opinion).
88 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 ( 1965).
89 President Nixon ran on a law and order platform in the 1968 election and within his first
two years made four appointments to the Court. George C. Thomas Ill, When Constitutional
Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, I 00
MICH. L. REv. 145, 172 (2001); Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra
note 61. No one could miss new Chief Justice Warren Burger's hostility to the exclusionary
rule. See Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman ?, 14 AM. U. L. REv. I, I
(1964).
90 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
9 l /d. at 637. In that case, while stating that Mapp applied to cases that were on direct
appeal when the Court decided Mapp, the Court refused to apply its holding to state court
convictions that had become final before its decision. !d. at 619 n. l .
92 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
93 /d. at 349.
87
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the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' " 94
Using the balancing process, the Court rejected the extension of the rule to civil
tax assessment proceedings 95 and to habeas corpus proceedings so long as the
prisoner had a fair hearing in the state criminal proceedings. 96
In addition to the cost-benefit analysis cases, the Court also began to
accept the argument that, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule was
deterring illegal police conduct, applying the rule to a police officer acting in
good-faith made little sense. Thus, in United States v. Peltier,97 the Court
refused to give retroactive effect to its earlier decision disallowing roving
patrols to make random stops.98 In Peltier, then-Justice Rehnquist spoke
broadly when he stated that "evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,
or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."99 Furthermore, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 100 the Court extended the good-faith analysis where it found that an
officer is entitled to make an arrest for a substantive offense, even if the statute
governing the arrest is later found unconstitutional. "A prudent officer,"
argued Chief Justice Burger, "should not have been required to anticipate that a
court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional." 101
By the 1980s, four justices had indicated their willingness to adopt a goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule. 102 Anticipating that the Court was
ready to adopt a wholesale good-faith exception, the Fifth Circuit en bane
stated, largely in dicta, that the Court had essentially adopted a good-faith
exception as long as the officer's mistake was a technical violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 103 Indeed, the line of cases described above led commentators, including me, to predict that the Court would adopt a broad good-faith
exception to the rule once President Reagan made appointments to the
Court. 104
94

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347).
!d. at 454.
96 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). Using similar analysis elsewhere, the
Court also held that the state may use illegally-seized evidence to impeach a defendant's
statements made on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28
(1980).
97 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
98 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
99 Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542.
100
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 ( 1979).
101
/d. at 37-38.
102
See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See also Edna F. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 635 (1978). By 1980, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist had argued for a good-faith exception. /d. at 635 n.6.
103
Williams , 622 F.2d at 841. Judge Rubin noted in his special concurrence that "five
members of the Court up to now have not suggested [the rule's] qualification, and they
constitute a majority." /d. at 849. As any student of the Fourth Amendment recognizes, the
Court has often created highly technical distinctions. As a result, an officer acting reasonably and in good faith may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment.
104 See Vitiello & Burger, supra note 15, at 15-16, 24-26.
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I proved to be a mediocre prognosticator. Instead, the 1980s saw a continued expansion of the good-faith exception, rather than its wholesale adoption.
In the companion cases of Leon 105 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 106 the
Court permitted the use of evidence at trial that was seized pursuant to technically defective search warrants. Despite the technical illegality of the police
conduct, Leon announced a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Or it
did, sort of. Specifically, Justice White argued that the inquiry into the
officer's good faith required an inquiry into whether "a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's
authorization" of the warrant. 107
While Justice White's opinion noted the frequent criticisms of the exclusionary rule (e.g., its substantial social costs and impairment of the truth-finding function of the judge and jury), 108 his overall analysis did not justify the
broader good-faith exception to non-warrant situations. Importantly, he contended that the exclusionary rule was aimed at police misconduct and that no
evidence demonstrated that judicial officers "are inclined to ignore or subvert
the Fourth Amendment." 109 The majority found no reason to believe that suppressing evidence would deter misconduct by judges and magistrates. 110
Whatever the wisdom of Justice White's majority opinion, 111 its focus on
deterring police, not magistrates, gave a possible limitation to the good-faith
rule. Subsequently, the Court has continued to expand the good-faith rule,
including to situations in which the police act in good-faith without a warrant.
For example, in Krull, the Court found that the exclusionary rule should not
apply when an officer objectively and reasonably relied on a state statute
authorizing an administrative search. 112 No doubt, the extension in Krull does
no violence to the rationale in Leon on the theory that the exclusionary rule is
not likely to deter legislators.
Finally, in Arizona v. Evans! 13 the Court addressed another search without a warrant. In that case, the police officer relied on his patrol car's computer
that indicated an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Evans's arrest. 114 The
warrant had in fact been quashed, but a clerk failed to update the computer
records! 15 Given Leon 's reasoning, the Court found extending the good-faith
exception relatively easy under the facts before the Court. One can substitute
105

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 ( 1984).
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 990-91 ( 1984).
10 7 Leon , 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
108
!d. at 907-08.
109
!d. at916.
11 0
/d. at 916-17.
111
See Justice Brennan 's dissent in which he stated that the Court created "a curious world
where the 'costs' of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and
where the 'benefits' ... are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand." /d. at 929
(Brennan, J. , dissenting).
112 lllinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 358 (1987).
113
Arizona v. Evans, 5 14 U.S. I (1995).
114
/d. at 4.
115
/d. at 4-5.
106
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"court employee" for magistrate or judge in Leon's discussion and justify the
holding in Evans. 116
Although the result in Herring is not surprising given the long line of case
law dating back over thirty years, the way in which the majority reached that
result certainly is. As developed below, Chief Justice Roberts did not write a
narrow opinion moving incrementally; instead, the opinion uses some rather
surprising language, unsupported by existing case law. Had the majority written with restraint, it could have achieved the same result, with much greater
legitimacy.
As the Court recognized in Herring , the precise question that the Court
left open in Evans was "whether the evidence should be suppressed if police
personnel were responsible for the error." 11 7 Resolving that question was
somewhat more difficult than was the situation in Evans. After all, as I indicated above, the Evans Court merely substituted "court employee" for magistrate or judge, which was not a great leap of logic. In Herring, Leon's logic
would have to be extended to police personnel, constituting a break from
Leon's insistence that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police
conduct and not that of judicial officers. Obviously, the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter law enforcement personnel and, in Herring , an unidentified
employee of a neighboring sheriff's department negligently failed to correct the
record. 118
Nonetheless, the Court could have extended Leon to the facts of Herring
without g reat violence to precedent. After all, the investigator had no reason to
suspect that the report of a warrant was inaccurate. I suspect that the record
was entirely silent on how often Coffee County sheriffs relied on information
from the neighboring county and how often that information turned out to be
erroneous. Short of some evidence suggesting general incompetence on the
part of Dale County employees, a reasonable officer no doubt could rely in
good faith on the representation that an outstanding warrant existed. Commentators have noted that much of Leon's reasoning relates generally to police
conduct, with or without a warrant, and might, therefore, lead to a general
good-faith rule for all police conduct. 1 19 But extending Leon in Herring would
have been a small step; indeed, the Court could have left open whether its
holding would apply if the investigator's own sheriff's department made the
clerical mistake. That question would be a more difficult one to analyze; for
example, the investigator might have information about frequency of errors and
know whether the responsible personnel have an incentive to permit lax procedures with an eye towards expanding police power. This question was not present by Herring's facts.
However, Chief Justice Roberts took a different course in Herring.
11 6

/d. at 16.
/d. at 16 n.5.
118
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 70 1-02 (2009) (citing the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion that the failure to update the computer record was negligent, but not reckless or
deliberate).
119
See, e.g., C raig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises
in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 298-99 (1985).
117
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HERRING's RADICAL LEAP

After discussing the cases from Mapp to Leon to Evans, the Court did not
simply apply that case law. Instead, it made a number of statements suggesting
a radical departure from existing precedent. Indeed, it did so by taking a number of statements out of context and misrepresenting existing case law, while
ignoring other case law. Here is that story.
Citing earlier case law, the majority opinion suggested that the exclusionary rule applies only to knowing violations of the Fourth Amendment. 120 Glossing over Leon's insistence that the standard is a negligence standard, Chief
Justice Roberts cited Judge Henry Friendly's law review article, in which he
argued, "'The beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a practice . . . outlawing evidence
obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights.' " 121 Chief Justice Roberts then reviewed the early exclusionary rule cases and concluded that, in all of
them, "the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional
conduct that was patently unconstitutional." 122 According to Chief Justice
Roberts, "[S]ince Leon, we have never applied the rule to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was
no more intentional or culpable than [the conduct involved in Herring]." 123
Thus, "As laid out in our cases , the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate,
reckJess, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or
systemic negligence." 124
As discussed above, the Court could have decided Herring by narrowly
extending earlier precedent. Specifically, it could have extended Evans to
police bureaucracy. But the Court's broad language suggests a wholesale
expansion of police power. For example, assume that in 1999, an officer
boarded a Greyhound bus stopped at a checkpoint and routinely squeezed luggage in the overhead rack of the bus. Assume also, that she believed that when
the public had access to an area or information, the police could engage 'in the
same conduct as could members of the public. Her belief in such a proposition
would hardly have been unreasonable in light of numerous cases grounded on
that argument. 125 No one would have called her conduct willful, reckless or
grossly negligent- or even negligent. However, despite the reasonableness of
the officer's mistake, the Court had no trouble finding not only that the
officer's conduct was illegal, but also that the evidence should be
suppressed. 126
Similarly, imagine a police officer in 2000, relying on lower court case
law, deciding that he could lawfully use a thermal imager to develop probable
cause that the occupant of a home was growing marijuana. Given a split
12
0
121

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
!d. (quoting Friendly, supra note 50, at 953).
122 !d.
123 /d.
124
/d. (emphasis added).
125
The officer could rely on a host of cases so holding. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445,449-50 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,41 ( 1988); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
126
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
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among lower courts on the question, no one could seriously contend that the
officer's mistake was unreasonable. Despite that, the Court in Kyllo v. United
States 127 never hinted that an officer's good-faith reasonable mistake was relevant to the application of the exclusionary rule.
Thus, while the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has expanded
police power in recent years, the Court has nonetheless suppressed evidence in
several cases without suggesting that the objective good-faith exception applies
to warrantless police action. Further, nothing in those cases suggests a watering down of the "reasonableness" requirement of the mistake.
Some commentators have noted that Leon's rationale spoke narrowly and
broadly. 128 By its terms, the good-faith reasonableness exception was limited
to police reliance on a warrant and the absence of incentive by magistrates to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment. 129 But an officer acting on a good-faith
reasonable belief would seem to be beyond deterrence: he reasonably believes
that his actions are lawful. Further, it may not be possible to deter an officer
acting unreasonably, but in good faith. 130 Despite those theoretical arguments,
to date, the Court has not seriously suggested that a defendant must show that
police acted culpably outside situations like Leon, Krull, and Evans.
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts's statement in Herring that "since Leon, we
have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than [the conduct involved in Herring]," 13 1 is, at a minimum, misleading.
Applied literally, the Chief Justice's statement would work a dramatic shift in
Fourth Amendment case law because it suggests that courts may allow the use
of any improperly obtained evidence unless the defendant shows some kind of
culpable conduct on the part of the police. The Court's characterization of
cases like Weeks and Mapp as involving flagrant and patently unconstitutional
conduct 132 is revisionist history: Chief Justice Roberts cites no case prior to
Herring that had attempted to limit the Fourth Amendment in such a way.
Indeed, the Court repeatedly suppressed evidence in case after case since Mapp
without the Court characterizing the police conduct as flagrant, patently unconstitutional, or even negligent. 133
Adopting a rule requiring a showing of culpable conduct to invoke the
exclusionary rule would further erode Fourth Amendment protection in an era
that has seen dramatic erosion of our privacy. Even before the War on Terror,
127

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (200 I).
I JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN c. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 20.06, at 393-94 (4th ed. 2006).
129
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-!7 (1984).
130
Whether a person who is acting unreasonably but in good faith can be deterred continues
to divide scholars, both in this setting and in the substantive criminal law. See, e.g., 0. W.
HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAw 48 (1881); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 51. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 365,36971 (1994).
131
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
132
!d. at 702.
133
See. e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000); Ari zona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987).
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the Court eroded the meaning of probable cause. 134 It narrowed the class of
defendants who could raise Fourth Amendment objections. 135 It has abandoned the Warren Court analysis of the Fourth Amendment that stated a preference for probable cause and search warrants absent a narrow exception. 136
Instead, the Court has frequently used the need for bright-line rules to expand
police power beyond underlying justifications. 137 It has placed pretext searches
off limits. 138 It has refused to limit the police's power to make custodial
arrests, even for trivial traffic offenses. 139 Even before Congress enacted legislation limiting state prisoners' ability to challenge their convictions on habeas
corpus, 140 the Court relegated state prisoners (except for the exceedingly few
who succeeded in getting review granted via the writ of certiorari) to review in
state court. 141 This is only a partial list of areas where the Court has cut back
on Fourth Amendment protection since the high water mark of the Warren
Court years.
134
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (rejecting the two-pronged test of
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), as too rigid, and replacing that test with a
more flexible totality of the circumstances test).
135
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (holding that ownership of property in another person's purse did not entitle the petitioner to challenge a search); Rakas v.
lllinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 ( 1978) (holding that property or possessory interest is required
in order to challenge a search).
136 See Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in California v. Acevedo, in which he discusses
the erosion of the probable cause and warrant requirements. Cali fomia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 581-84 ( 1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
307 ( 1999) (allowing search of objects in an automobile capable of concealing objects of the
search). Under the Warren Court approach, if the police refied on an exception to the
requirement of probable cause and a warrant, their conduct was constrained by the underlying rationale that justified the exception. Thus, in Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768
( 1969), when conducting a search incident to a lawful arrest, police were allowed to search
only in the area where an arrestee could grab a weapon or evidence that he might then
destroy. To search beyond that limited area would be to search in an area not justified by the
underlying rationale for the exception to the general rule.
137
See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622-23 (2004) (stating that there is a
"need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers"); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 459-60 ( 1981) (arguing for a "straightforward rule, easi ly applied, and predictably
enforced"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 2 18, 235 (1973) (rejecting "case-by-case
adjudication" of Fourth Amendment issues).
138 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 ( 1996). In Whren, officers involved in narcotics
enforcement made a stop of a driver for a traffic violation under facts where no one could
seriously argue that the officers intended to cite the driver for a violation of traffic laws. !d.
at 808-09. But the Court held, in effect, that a suspect cannot demonstrate the officer's
subjective motivation in making the traffic stop as long as the officer had objective grounds
that the suspect violated traffic laws. !d. at 809, 8 13.
139 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323-24, 354-55 (2001) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor seatbelt violation). Until this tenn, as long as the an·est was lawful, the police could then conduct a full
search of the interior compartment of the vehicle. See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623-24;
Belton, 453 U.S. at462-63. Interestingly, the same Court that decided Herring narrowed the
scope of police searches when the search of the vehicle is justified as a search incident to the
arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 17 10, 1723 (2009).
140 28 u.s.c. § 2263 (2006).
141 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976).
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I read Herring as signaling its willingness to make a quantum leap away
from existing precedent. I suspect that in the appropriate case, the Court will
make the quantum leap and hold that courts should exclude evidence only if the
police conduct is culpable as used in Herring. Thus, even in cases of individual acts of negligence, the Court seems poised to adopt its revisionist view of
its case law as somehow limited only to flagrant or deliberate misconduct.
Hudson v. Michigan 142 includes some additional support for this thesis.
In that case, the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to a violation of
the knock-and-announce rule. 143 In so holding, the majority relied on alternative remedies to victims of illegal police conduct. 144 In a bit of rhetorical flourish, Justice Scalia wrote that:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply
because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago.
That would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal
regime that existed almost half a century ago. 145

For example, according to Justice Scalia, Dollree Mapp had no civil remedy
under Section 1983. 146 Subsequently, however, the Court expanded the application of Section 1983 to allow suits against municipalities 147 and held that the
Fourth Amendment allowed a private right of action against federal officers. 148
Thus, she would have a federal constitutional tort claim were her case to arise
today.
Further, Justice Scalia relied on the increased police professionalism as
another reason why the Court could dispense with the exclusionary rule in Hudson. He cited increasing evidence that police departments "take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously," citing "'wide-ranging reforms in the
education, training, and supervision of police officers.'" 149
The four-justice dissent in Hudson pointed out some of the problems with
this line of reasoning. For example, according to Justice Breyer, "[Tlhe majority, as it candidly admits, has simply 'assumed' that, '[a]s far as [it] know[s],
ci vii liability is an effective deterrent .... ">~ 50 The dissent could have cited
the additional fact that Justice Scalia has hardly demonstrated a liberal attitude
towards expanding the scope of Section 1983. 151 Furthermore, as many schol142
143
144

145
146
147

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
!d. at 589-90.
/d. at 595-97.
!d. at 597.
/d.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
149
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (quoting S. WALKER, TAMING THE SvsTEM: THE CoNTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51 (1993)).
150
/d. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
151
Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' s plurality opinion in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760 (2003). For a list and discussion of cases joined by Justice Scalia that limit section 1983
rights, see RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JusTICE ANTONIN ScALIA AND THE CoNSERVATIVE
REVIVAL 173-75 (1997).
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ars believe, civil actions are "few and far between, and therefore relatively punchless as punishing mechanisms .... " 152
Most of us who study criminal justice probably gagged at Justice Scalia's
assurance that increased police professionalism diminishes the need for the
exclusionary rule. Like Samuel Walker, the criminologist whose work Justice
Scalia cited for that proposition, 153 observers of the criminal justice system
know that the exclusionary rule created the incentive to train police to comply
with the Fourth Amendment. 154
Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has claimed that his originalist approach to the
Constitution prevents justices from imposing their values on the public in the
guise of the law. 155 Others have demonstrated the inadequacies of the originalist methodology. 156 But, as Professor Israel has argued, adherence to stare
decisis advances the rule of law. Adhering to precedent that spans a significant
period of time means that a justice is not following an idiosyncratic view of the
law or one's own subjective view of the law. Moreover, even when justices
evolve doctrine slowly, they build on decisions by the previous generation of
justices and thus, are not open to the criticism that their view of the law breaks
from the past. Herring , however, shows no similar deference to the past and
therefore, leaves the emerging majority open to the criticism that the new rules
are true ipse dixit. Herring signifies the rule of men, not the rule of law. 157

152 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REv. 363, 385 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
011 the Fourth Ame11dmenr, 58 MlNN. L. REv. 349, 360 (1974).
153
Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25 , 2006, at M5, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/25/opinion/oe-walker25.
154
See, e.g., DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 128, at 377-78.
155 See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849
( 1989).
156 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Colltradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, I 089-91 ( 198 1); Ronald
Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 660 (1990) (book review).
157 My only hesitation in reaching this conclusion is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Hudson, in which he stated, " [T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled
and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt." 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). I have trouble squaring his position Hudson and the majority opinion in Herring. I hope that I am mistaken in my reading of Herring, but its drift seems inescapable.

